Disparities in Voter Numbers Reflect Uneven Community Funding

Per-capita analysis of Belize’s Constituency Development Fund shows sharp disparities tied to unequal voter rolls, with smaller urban seats receiving more dollars per resident than larger rural constituencies, based on calculations by public-interest litigant Jeremy Enriquez.

The figures, derived from data disclosed under a Freedom of Information request, compare each constituency’s monthly CDF allocation against its number of registered voters. The results indicate that funding impact varies widely once population size is factored in.

A key example is Toledo West, which has roughly 8,000 registered voters and receives $20,000 monthly under the CDF. That translates to about $2.50 per person. By contrast, Queen Square, with about 2,778 voters and a $10,000 monthly allocation, works out to approximately $3.60 per person — about 31 percent higher per resident despite receiving half the gross funding.

Enriquez argues that this illustrates how unequal constituency sizes affect not only political representation but also the practical distribution of public resources. The Constitution of Belize calls for constituencies to have, as nearly as practicable, equal numbers of voters — a standard tied to the democratic principle of equal voting power.

The per-capita breakdown shows other notable contrasts. Mesopotamia appears among the highest, at just over $4 per resident, while several larger or more rural constituencies fall below $2.50 per person. Stann Creek West and Belmopan rank near the lower end of the scale, based on the charted estimates.

Because CDF funds are used by area representatives for community assistance, small projects, and social support, Enriquez maintains that unequal voter distribution can translate into uneven access to publicly funded benefits at the constituency level.

Using Toledo West again as an illustration, the calculations suggest that for its per-capita CDF level to approximate Queen Square’s, its voter roll would need to be closer to 5,500 rather than about 8,000 — underscoring the structural effect of malapportionment.

The analysis positions the CDF as a practical example of broader equity concerns linked to constituency size, where both representation and resource impact intersect with the constitutional aim of balanced voter distribution.