Revenue Authority Bill: How well do the unions’ claims hold up?

As BTSD workers walk out and unions warn of lost jobs, pensions and accountability, a close reading of the Revenue Authority Bill produces a corroboration score of 75 out of 100—indicating high corroboration overall. Their strongest case lies in the concentration of power, not in claims that the legislation wipes out existing employment and pension rights.

As readers may already know, on Wednesday, August 26, employees of the Belize Tax Service Department (BTSD) walked off the job as opposition intensified to the Revenue Authority Bill, 2026, which would replace the existing department with a semi-autonomous Revenue Authority.

Among the concerns raised by the Public Service Union (PSU) and employees are the fate of workers and their pensions, the powers afforded to the Minister of Finance and chief executive officer, the limited authority of the proposed Advisory Board, and the implications of the new arrangement for public accountability.

But how closely do those concerns correspond with what Parliament is actually being asked to enact?

The Reporter reviewed the Bill and tested 12 identifiable concerns raised publicly against the relevant provisions of the proposed legislation. Each was scored on a five-point Bill Corroboration Index (BCI), ranging from zero, where the Bill provides very little or no textual support for the concern, to four, where the Bill provides very high textual support.

The 12 concerns produced a combined score of 36 points from a possible 48, equivalent to a BCI of 75 out of 100—placing the unions’ concerns collectively within the “high corroboration” range.

The index does not mean that the unions are “75% correct”. Rather, it measures how strongly the specific concerns examined by The Reporter are supported by the text of the draft legislation itself.

And the distribution of those scores matters. The unions’ case is strongest on the proposed governance structure and concentration of authority. It becomes considerably weaker when the claims concern the outright loss of public-service employment, accrued pension benefits or the absence of external accountability.

UNIONS' STRONGEST POINT

The most striking findings concern governance.

Section 5 establishes a seven-member Advisory Board appointed by the Minister. More unusually, section 5(5) states explicitly that this Board may provide policy advice and recommendations but “shall not exercise any executive, operational, supervisory, or decision-making authority” over the Authority, its CEO or Chief Officers.

On this concern, the BCI assigned the unions the maximum 4 out of 4 for very high corroboration. The limitation is not an inference about what the legislation might eventually produce. It appears expressly in the Bill.

There is, however, a wrinkle.

Section 6 gives the same Board substantial responsibilities. It is to review and approve the Authority’s strategic vision, human-resource policies, service standards, strategic and operational plans and budget, while monitoring performance, internal audit and enterprise risk management.

Thus the Bill simultaneously denies the Board “decision-making authority” and requires it to review and approve a considerable number of decisions. At the least, the two provisions create a tension that may merit clarification before enactment.

The unions also scored 4 out of 4 on their broader concern about the power retained by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister, according to section 5, appoints the seven-member Board. The Minister also appoints the authority's CEO and Chief Officers by Order, although those appointments are subject to an affirmative resolution of the National Assembly.

Other provisions give the Minister approval authority over where the Authority keeps its funds, its tender and contracting rules, its annual budget and employee-benefit schemes.

Section 25 goes further. It permits the Minister to give the Board and CEO “general policy directives”, which they must implement. It also states that, in carrying out the functions assigned under section 12(1), the CEO is subject to the Minister’s “general directions”. The full language states:

“The Minister may give to the Board and the CEO such general policy directives with respect to the carrying out of their functions under this Act as they consider necessary or expedient and the Board or the CEO shall give effect to such directives.

(2) In the performance of the functions under section 12(1), the CEO is subject to the general directions of the Minister and accountable to the Board”

The distinction is important. The Bill does not expressly say that a Minister may direct the Authority on the tax affairs of an individual taxpayer. But the unions’ broader contention—that the legislation leaves substantial institutional influence in the hands of the Minister—is strongly supported by the text.

A POWERFUL CEO, BUT NOT AN UNACCOUNTABLE ONE

The proposed CEO would also occupy a powerful position.

Section 12 makes the officeholder the Authority’s “principal executive officer”, responsible for its daily management and administration as well as its substantive revenue functions, including enforcement of the revenue laws through civil proceedings.

Chief Officers perform functions allocated by the CEO and are themselves subject to the CEO’s general directions.

When those provisions are read alongside the restrictions placed on the Advisory Board, the proposed architecture becomes clearer. Operational authority resides principally with the CEO; considerable appointment, approval and policy authority remains with the Minister; and the Board occupies an important but deliberately constrained position between them.

Yet describing the resulting Authority as wholly unaccountable would go too far.

That broader union contention received only 1 out of 4 for low corroboration.

Section 20 requires the Auditor General to audit the Authority annually and gives that office access to its books, records, documents, assets and information. The Auditor General may also undertake management or comprehensive audits. Annual reports must eventually be laid before the National Assembly.

Nor does the Authority get to retain the taxes it collects as a pot of money outside the Government’s accounts. Section 28 requires all revenue and public monies collected under the revenue laws to be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It expressly states:

"All revenue and public moneys collected by the Authority under the revenue laws shall be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund."

The unions’ accountability argument therefore finds considerable support when directed at where decision-making power is concentrated. It becomes much harder to sustain if taken to mean that the Authority would exist beyond independent audit or parliamentary scrutiny altogether.

WORKERS' PROTECTION?

On employment, the picture changes considerably.

The unions are correct that existing BTSD employees are not automatically guaranteed positions inside the new Revenue Authority.

That concern scored 4 out of 4 for very high corroboration.

Section 16 gives permanent public officers three options. They may voluntarily retire; apply to work for the Authority; or remain in the public service.

Those choosing the Authority must successfully complete a recruitment and selection process. Moving from the BTSD to the Revenue Authority is therefore not an automatic transfer.

But that is only half of section 16.

An employee may instead choose to remain in the public service. In that event, the Bill says the person “shall be placed in an office commensurate with the office held” before the Act came into force.

For that reason, the broader concern that permanent BTSD officers could simply lose public-service employment as a consequence of the transition scored 0 out of 4—no or very low corroboration.

The distinction is consequential.

An employee has no statutory guarantee of a job inside the new Revenue Authority. But a permanent officer covered by section 16 does have a statutory option to remain in the public service, with the legislation requiring commensurate placement.

Their position at the Tax Service may disappear. Their option to remain a public officer does not.

AND THEN THERE ARE THE PENSIONS

A more nuanced distinction emerges on pensions.

PSU President Dean Flowers’ criticism is not simply that the Bill makes no provision for pensions. Rather, his concern is that workers moving from the public service into the new Revenue Authority are not guaranteed the ability to continue earning and protecting the pension arrangements under which they are presently enrolled.

The Bill does provide some protection. Section 16(3) expressly states that an officer who voluntarily retires or successfully joins the Authority is entitled, upon leaving the public service, to any pension, gratuity or other retirement benefit to which that person is entitled under the Pensions Act.

In other words, the Bill does not say that pension or retirement benefits to which an officer is already entitled simply disappear upon transition to the Authority.

But Flowers’ broader concern ostensibly lies in what happens after that transition.

The Bill does not guarantee that an employee who joins the Revenue Authority will continue accumulating future pension benefits under the same public-service pension arrangement. Section 34 instead provides that the Authority, with the Minister’s approval, may establish schemes covering medical benefits, pensions, gratuities and other retirement, disability or death benefits for its employees.

The wording matters. The legislation protects pension and retirement benefits to which departing public officers are already entitled, but does not explicitly provide equivalent certainty about the continuation of their existing pension arrangements once they become employees of the Authority.

On that narrower formulation of the union’s concern, the Bill provides very high corroboration.

The distinction is therefore not between having a pension and having none. It is between protection of existing entitlement and continuity of pension arrangements going forward. On the former, the Bill provides an express safeguard. On the latter, Flowers’ concern appears to find substantial support in what the Bill leaves unresolved.

WHAT 75 OUT OF 100 ACTUALLY MEANS

Taken together, the 12 concerns examined by The Reporter accumulated 36 of the maximum 48 points, producing a Bill Corroboration Index of 75 out of 100.

On the BCI, scores from zero to 20 represent very low corroboration; 21 to 40, low; 41 to 60, moderate; 61 to 80, high; and 81 to 100, very high.

The unions therefore fall firmly within the high-corroboration range.

But the aggregate score conceals what is arguably the more important finding. The unions score particularly strongly when they describe the institutional architecture actually contained in the legislation: an Advisory Board expressly denied certain forms of authority; extensive operational powers vested in the CEO; significant appointment and approval powers retained by the Minister; and ministerial authority to issue general policy directives that the CEO and Board must implement.

Those are not forecasts. They are features written into the Bill.

The unions fare relatively worse when broader claims run ahead of those provisions. Permanent officers are not simply left without employment. They may remain in the public service and must then receive commensurate placement. Existing pension and retirement entitlements are expressly protected. The Authority remains subject to audit by the Auditor General. Annual reports reach the National Assembly. And revenue collected under the revenue laws must enter the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

The Bill therefore strengthens both sides of the argument, though not equally.

Its provisions provide substantial support for concerns about the concentration and distribution of institutional power, while providing significantly less support for fears that workers’ existing employment and pension protections simply disappear. This category of concern is more nuanced.

That distinction matters.